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WAIVER OF PROTEST: A COMPARATIVE STUDY*

Raul Olivera y Borgest

I
ADMISSIBILITY

General Observations
(a) Origin and Use. Parallel to the study of protest, it is pertinent
to consider the nature and legal e:ffects 1 of exempting clauses 2 which,
while not essential, may be found in bills of exchange. Waiver of protest appears to have been introduced by the practice in France during
the first third of the nineteenth century.8 It is generally used to moderate the co.usequences of non-payment, by a drawer who lacks confidence in the solvency of the drawee, or who fears that he may not be
able to provide the necessary funds before i:naturity. The drawer can
thus spare the susceptibilities of a drawee who does not wish nonpayment to be authenticated by a protest. This situation occurs especially in the relationships between dealers and their customers, when
the former draw bills of exchange on the latter for sums due; also
when the amount of the bill is very small and it is desired to avoid
costs that would increase the debt disproportionately.4 On the other
hand, the clause may be inserted at the instance and for the benefit of
a payee or holder, when he'wishes to avoid the inconvenience of having
I.

*

This article is part of a monograph prepared by the author in connection with
The Research in Inter-American Law at the University of Michigan, described by Professor Hessel E. Yntema in an article in 43 MICH. L. REv. 549 (1944). Special
acknowledgement is due Mrs. Roberta Moore Garner of the research staff for the
translation.-E d.
J.D., University of Habana, Habana, Cuba; LL.M., University of Michigan
Law School.-Ed.
1
"La clausola senza spese ha valore cambiario, non di diritto commune." 1
MossA, LA CAMBIALE SECONDO LA NUOVA LEGGE 366, § 332 (Milano, 1937).
2
Valeri distinguishes essential and accessory clauses and subdivides the latter into
supplementary and derogatory. 2 VALERI, D1RITTO CAMBIARIO ITALIANO 58, § 134
(Milano, 1938).
8
LiVY-BRUHL, HISTOIRE DE LA LETTRE DE CHANGE EN FRANCE AU xvn 8 ET
xvm8 SIECLES 289 (Paris, 1933).
4
4 LYoN-CAEN ET RENAULT, TRAITE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL, 6th ed., 97, § 100
bis (Paris, 1923). Cf. REBORA, LETRAS DE CAMBio, 3d ed., 137, § 77 (Paris, 1928);
2 WILLIAMS, LA LETRA DE CAMBIO EN LA DOCTRINA, LEGISLACION Y JURISPRUDENCIA
35 (Buenos Aires, 1930); l DAVIS, LA LETRA DE CAMDIO 190, § I 17 (Santiago de
Chile, 1928); 2 TENA, DERECHO coMERCIAL MEXICANO, 2d ed., 343, § 223 (Mexico,
1938).
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to make protest ( and in some legislations he may thus also avoid
having to present the bill and to give notice of dishonor), or in order
to facilitate the discounting of the bill at a bank, in case the drawee
resides in a locality without banking facilities. 5
(b) Expressions Used. Although there exists no pre-established
formula, the expressions used in the different countries exhibit a certain
uniformity, the most common being retour sans frais, retour sans
protet, retorno sin gastos, or simply sans frais, sin protesto, or "protest
waived." 6 Even mere initials seem to be admissible,7 although they
are not very desirable, especially in Spanish, where the initials of sin
gastos, "S.G." (without costs), might be confused with the clause sin_
garantia (without recourse), permitted with an entirely different connotation by some laws with respect to endorsers. There are other expressions, similar to those mentioned above, to which a somewhat
different meaning has_ oeen attached ( e.g., au besoin san frais, 8 con
spese 0 ) but these are little used today, and the tendency is to treat all
alike.
5

PINOL AGULL6, CoMENTARIOS AL c6mGo MERCANTIL ESPANOL, SECCION LETRA
DE CAMBIO 369 (Madrid, 1933).
ll Sin gastos, sin protesto, sin protesto si el librado es vecino de una plaza no
bancable, senza spese, senza protesto, senza preguidizio, ohne Kosten, ohne Protest.
Although the French terms sans frais and sans protet were said in earlier works
to have been in use in England, it is very doubtful that they are now. At least, they
seem to be unknown in America (United States). BYLES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF BILLS OF ExcHANGE.,, PROMISSORY NoTEs, AND CHECQUES, 19th ed., 252, note x
(London, I 93 I).
Although the use of the term "waiver" seems to be inveterate and it would now
be very difficult to substitute an alternative, the term is so ambiguous that its use in
legal proceedings and discussions should be avoided so far as possible. F ALCONBRIDGE,
THE LAw OF BANKS AND BANKING, BILLS, NoTEs, AND CHEQUES, 5th ed., 566
(Toronto, 1935). See EwART, WAIVER DISTRIBUTED AMONG THE DEPARTMENTS:
ELECTION, EsToPPEL, CoNTRACT, RELEASE 1 5 ( Cambridge, · I 9 l 7) ; 3 W ILLTSTON,
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CoNTRAcTS, 2d ed., 1958, § 678 (New York, 1936). Id.
1q60, § 679, gives nine distinct meanings of the term "waiver."
The term "waiver" has been translated as "renuncia" in the Panama Ley de
Documentos Negociables (see, for instance, art. 109) and as "excusa'' in the Colombia
Ley de Instrumentos Negociables (art. 111), although the Colombian author, Cock,
prefers the term "renuncia," which is also that adopted by the Inter-American High
Commission on Uniform Legislation in its Spanish version. CocK, DERECHO CAMBIARIO CoLoMBIANO 165-166, and-131 (1933).
7
2 MosSA, LA CAMBIALE SECONDO LA NUOVA LEGGE 579 (Milano, 1937).
8
The Court of Commerce of Paris deemed this clause to mean that the holder
should address himself to the referee in case of need before protesting the instrument.
20 DALLOZ, REPERTOIRE DE LEGISLATION, DE DOCTRINE, ET DE JURISPRUDENCE 300,
§ 647 (Paris, 1850).
9 The clause con spese inserted in a bill means only "with protest," and not also
with repayment of the costs of protest. It is within the authority of the judicial officer
and not incumbent on the creditor to determine whether costs of protest should also
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(c) Criticisms. . Waiver of protest has been criticized 10 on the
ground that it encourages negligence and fraud on the part of the
holder, who may neglect or deliberately fail to present the bill for
payment if to his advantage. Such may be the case, for example, if the
acceptor is about to fail, or if a difference in the rates of exchange makes
the action of recourse more profitable. Moreover, it is alleged, the
bill of exchange is discredited by such a clause, since it indicates, on
the part of the person who affixes it, fear that the bill may be dishonored, and the issue of bills of exchange without provision of funds, etc.,
is encouraged.
Others point out that by inclusion of the clause in question:
. The position of the parties secondarily liable is impaired, since
when payment is demanded of them by the holder, they are not
certain whether the party primarily liable has actually failed to
honor the bill and whether, as a consequence, the obligation to
pay devolves upon them. Even the position of the holder is
weakened thereby, in view of the possibility that the defendant
can allege this defense, not possible with the protest.11
In considering the formal requirements and the scope, substantive
and personal effects of this clause, and the solutions offered by modern
legislation, we shall see that many of these criticisms are without
foundation.
(d) Legislative Systems: New Classification. The text writers
generally 12 differentiate and classify the various legal provisions on this
subject in three groups or systems: the Belgian,18 German,14 and
be demanded on a bill domiciled with the debtor. Tribunal Venezie, 14.I.1933, 58
Foro It. Rep. (1933) 424, § 164.
10
BONELLI, DELLA CAMBIALE, DELL'ASSEGNO BANCARIO, E DEL CONTRATO DE
CONTO CORRENTE 502 (Milano, 1930).
11
2 TENA, DERECHo MERCANTIL MEXICANO, 2d ed., 344, § 223 (Mexico,
1938).
12
RinoRA, LETRAS DE CAMBio, 3d ed., 376, § 305 (Paris ,1928); 2 BLANCO,
ESTUDios ELEMENTALEs DE DERECHo MERCANTIL, 3d ed., 271 (Madrid, 19u); 2
WILLIAMS, LA LETTRA DE CAMBIO EN LA DOCTRINA, LEGISLACION, Y JURISPRUDENCIA
35-37 (Buenos Aires, 1930).
18
" • • • La clause du retour sans frais, inseree dans l'e.ffet par le tireur, dispense
le porteur de !'obligation de faire protester la lettre et d'intenter dans la quinzaine
l'action recursoire avec notification du protet. Toutefois, le porteur est tenu d'informer
du non-payment de la lettre, dans la quanzaine qui suit l'echeance, ceux contre qui
il veut conserver son recours, et ceux-ci ont la meme obligation a remplir vis-a-vis
de leurs garants, dans la quinzaine de la reception de l'avis.
"La clause du retour sans frais emanee d'un endosseur produit ses e.ffets vis-a-vis
de cet endosseur et de ceux qui le suivent." Belgium, Law of 20.V.1872, art. 59.
See 1 FREDERICQ, PRINCIPES DE DROIT COMMERCIAL BELGE 465, § 483 (Gantes,
1928).
14
"Die Aufforderung, keinen Protest erhaben su lassen ("ohne Protest," "ohne
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Italian 15 systems. Without failing to recognize th~ advantages of this
classification, the present writer prefers not to follow it in the present
exposition, in view of the impossibility of adapting to such a broad
generalization the diverse problems and solutions presented. However, with regard to each particular problem, the laws have been
grouped according to "systems" with reference to the individual topic,
without dogmatic pretension and purely for the purpose of illustration.
Thus, considering the legal attitudes· concerning the admissibility
of waiver clauses under the bills of exchange law, the writer prefers
to distinguish four systems,· arbitrarily designated the French, Spanish,
Italian, and "statutory."

French System (Haiti, Dominican Republic, Argentina,
Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay)
The system exemplified by the French legislation and jurisprudence is characterized by the absence of any reference to the waiver
clause in the positive law, which, on the contrary, expressly prescribes
the indispensability of protest as a proceeding for which no other act
can be substitl,1.ted.16 At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the
legitimacy of such clauses was discussed, but since r834 they have been
completely accepted by the courts 17 and in common commercial usage,18
in which they are very frequent, and they present no difficulties other
than of their interp~etation.
·
.
As Lyon-Caen and Renault explain,19 the intention of the parties
is evidently powerless to bestow the character of a bill of exchange on
an instrument that does not comply with all requirements prescribed
2.

Ko.sten," usw.) gilt aus Erlass des Protestes, nicht aber als Erlass de Pflicht zur
Rechtzeitigen Prasentation. Der Wechselverpflichtete, von welchem jene Aufforderung
ausgeht, muss die Beweislast iibernehmen, wenn er die rechtzeitig geschenhene
· Prasentation in Abrede stellt. Gegen die Pflicht sum Ersatze der Protestkosten schiizt
jene Aufforderung nicht." Germany, Wechselordnung, art. 42; cf. JACOBI, DERECHO
CAMBIARIO, LA LETRA DE CAMBIO y EL CHEQUE 104 (Madrid, 1930).
15
"La clausola 'senza protesto' o 'senza spese' od altra che dispensi dall'obbligo
di protestare apposta dal traente, dall' emittente o da un girante, si ha per no
scritta." Italy, C.Com. 1882, art. 309; cf. 3 V1vANTE, TRATADO DE DERECHO MERCATIL 427, No. 1318 (Madrid, 1936).
·
16
Fr.-C. Com., art. 175.
17
4 LYoN-CAEN ET RENAULT, TRAITE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL, 6th ed., 97, § 100
bis (Paris, 1923); 4 MALAGARRIGA, CoDIGO DE CoMERCIO COMENTADO, 3d ed., 384
(Buenos Aires, 1928).
18
7 DALLOZ, REPERTOIRE PRATIQUE DE LEGISLATION, DE DOCTRINE, ET DE
JURISPRUDENCE 637, § 334 (Paris, 1915).
19
4 LYoN-CAEN ET RENAULT, .TRAITE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL, 6th ed., 95, §
99 (Paris, 1923).
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by law, but in a bill satisfying all conditions that the law demands, the
intention may modify its legal' effects. Thus, under the decisions of
the courts, a bill of exchange admits all accessory stipulations which
are not contrary to law or public policy ( ordre public).
Protest and the formalities which should, on principle, accompany
it, do not pertain to ordre public.20 The parties in whose interest these
requirements have been established may freely renounce the benefits
thereof, "without in the least infringing upon the rights or disturbing
the interests of society." 21 Their agreement falls within the sphere
of freedom of contract without threatening the public order .2 2
In America, it is natural that what has been said of the French system should apply to Haiti and the Dominican Republic, since they have
adopted the French Code of Commerce word for word. 23 Also to be
included within this system are the following other American laws on
bills of exchange which have taken the French Code as model: Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay. The Argentine writers in particular unanimously agree on its acceptance.24 In his commentary on
article 723 of the Argentine Code of Commerce,25 it is pointed out by
Id. 350, § 376; 7 DALLOZ, REPERTOIRE PRATIQUE DE LEGISLATION, DE
DOCTRINE, ET DE JURISPRUDENCE 637, § 332 (Paris, 1915).
21 2 0BARRio, CuRsp DE DERECHO COMMERCIAL, 2d ed., 392, § 262 (Buenos
Aires, 1924).
22 2 WILLIAMS, LA LETRA DE CAMEJO EN LA DOCTRINA, LEGISLACION, Y JURISPRUDENCIA 35 (Buenos Aires, 1930); REBORA, LETRAS DE CAMBIO, 3d ed., 373,
§ 305 (Paris, 1928).
28
See French cases cited by BoRNo, CoDE DE CoMMERCE HAITIEN MIS AU
coURANT DE LA LEGISLATION EN VIGUER 90, note a (Port-au-Prince, 1910), in regard
to Haiti-C. Com., art. I 59.
24
PINERO, LA LETRA DE CAMBIO ANTE EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO,
2d ed., 272 (Buenos Aires, 1932); 4 MALAGARRIGA, C6DIGO DE CoMERCIO
COMMENTADO, 3d ed., 383, § 361 (Buenos Aires, 1928); 2 0BARRio, CuRso DE
DERECHO COMERCIAL, 2d ed., 392, § 262 (Buenos Aires, 1924); 3 ARGANA, TRATADO
DE DERECHO COMERCIAL 96-97 (Asuncion, 1936); MALAGARRIGA, LA UNIFICACION
INTERNACIONAL DE LA LETRA DE CAMBio 222 (Buenos Aires, 1916). Rivarola mentions
it among "the non-essential statements, not provided for by the law." 4 R1vAROLA,
TRATADO DE DERECHO COMERCIAL ARGENTINO 675, § 1293 (b) (Buenos Aires, 1940).
The lapse of rights (caducidad) alleged by the avaliste does not occur if he expressly waived protest and other forJilalities required by law, asserting that he would
maintain his liability. Camara Comercial, 88 GACETA DEL FoRo 98 (Sept.-Oct., 1930);
cited in 3 VICTORICA, SEGUNDO DICCIONARIO DE JURISPRUDENCIA 996 (Buenos Aires,
193 I)•
Contra: Ortiz y Arce, 26 ENcicLOPEDIA JURIDICA ESPANOLA 284 (Barcelona,
1910).
25
Cf. Fr.-C. Com., art. 175; Dom.-C. Com., art. 175; Haiti-C. Com.,
art. 172; Bol.-C. Mere., art. 417; Parag.-C. Com., art. 723; Urug.-C. Com.,
art. 916.
20
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Segovia 26 that no act performed at the request of the holder can take
the place of protest, except in the presence of the clause retour sans
frais. He states that the legal text does not preclude the stipulation
retour sans frais or the like whereby necessity of protest is renounced.
Rebora 21 bases his acceptance of this position on- the fact that the
French Code of Commerce contains "no provision relating to optional
clauses, and yet the opinion favoring their admission is unanimous."
He adds:

If it be said that the provision in our article 663 [presumably
he means article 662] the provisions of which article 714 repeats,
is absolute and rejects the admissibility of the clause, we should
have to note that it does not differ from that enacted by articles
168 and 170 of the French Code, which served as model for 663
[ 662?] of Argentina ..., which did not prevent the development
of the jurisprudence just mentioned.28
Williams 29 sketc,4es a less convincing argument, contending that the
law itself, in its context,3° has anticipated lack of protest, thereby indicating that it is not absolutely indispensable. He considers 81 that, in
spite of the fact that article 1 of Ley 9689 provides that "the execution of bills of exchange shall issue with visa of the bill and protests,"
a suit initiated on an instrument not accompanied by protest implies
renunciation of a part of the procedural requirement.82
26
2 SEGOVIA, ExPLICACION y CRITICA DEL NUEVO C6DIGO -DE CoMERCIO DE LA
REPUBLICA ARGENTINA 181, note 2404 (Buenos Aires, 1933).
27
REBORA, LETRAS DE CAMBio, 3d ed., 378, § 306 (Paris, 1928).
28
Fr.-C. Com., art. 168. Cf. Dom.-C. Com., art. 168; Haiti-C. Com.,
art. 165; Arg.-C. Com., art. 714; Bol.-C. Mere., art. 453; Parag.-C. Com., art.
714; Urug.-C. Com., art. 907 (bill prejudiced for want of protest).
29 2 WILLIAMS, LA LETRA DE CAMBIO EN LA DOCTRINA, LEGISLACION, Y JURISPRUDENCIA 38 {Buenos Aires, 1930). Cf. 4 R1vAROLA, TRATADO DE DERECHO
COMERCIAL ARGENTINO 675, § 1293(b) (Buenos Aires, 1940).
80
Williams cites Arg.-C. Com., arts. 621, 666, and 714.
81
Id. 39, note 1.
82
There are some rules of procedure that pertain to public order and others that
do not. In general, rules of procedure are not rules of public order. In order that a
procedural rule be deemed a rule of public order, it must result from its terms, express
or implied, that the parties are without power to modify it. This must be determined
in each case, and in case of doubt, the decision should incline to the negative. ToMAS
JoFRE, l JuR. ARG. 66-67, note 40 (1918).
Renunciation of steps in the executory proceeding is valid: Gandulfo v. Roca de
Bollini, Cam. Civil la. de la Capital, 2a. Inst., B.A., 23.IV.1920, 4 JuR. ARG. 175
( 1920). Cf. Helguera v. Gabato, Cam. Civil la. de la Capital, 2a. Inst., B.A.,
2.VIII.1926, 21 JuR. ARG. 690 (1926). See notes to 18 JuR. ARG. 192 and 851
(1925); 19 Juil. ARG. 254 (1926). Cf. Urug.-C. Proc. Civ., arts. 896, 899, which
establish and regulate the renunciation of steps in the executory proceeding.
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In Uruguay, Garrone 33 states in his criticism of the Code of Commerce, that, although the formalities of protest have not been simplified, it is also true that it has not been sought to make them more
complicated, and therefore the clauses tending to excuse the obligation
to make protest, which he considers to be in common use, have been
left standing.
3. Spanish System (Cuba)
Although from the point of view of positive law the legislative
norms of this system exhibit almost complete likeness to those of the
French, the doctrine, for the most part, has elaborated a somewhat
surprising, although not new, interpretation, since the same is to be
found, with respect to a waiver clause inserted by the drawer, in the
Albertine Code and in the Italian Code of 1865.8 ¼
(a) Prevailing Doctrine: Conversion of Bill into Note. The first
difficulty with regard to the admissibility of waiver of protest is encountered by the writers 85 in articles 502 and 509 of the Spanish Code
of Commerce, which categorically and without exception prescribe the
necessity of protest for the exercise of the action of recourse. N evertheless, it has already been seen that the French system, more attentive
to the necessities of commercial practice and although encountering the
same legal obstacles,86 admits such stipulations.
88
GARRONE, LETRAS DE CAldBIO 143 and 154 (commentaries on art. 916)
(Montevideo, 1936).
8
~Albertine Code, art. 189; Code of 1865, art. 261; if inserted by the drawer,.
it would lose the nature of a bill of exchange and be transformed into a promissory
note or order to pay, with the same effects as a simple obligation. SuPINO E DE SEMo,.
DELLA CAMBIALE E DELL'ASSEGNO BANCARIO 353 (Torino, 1935); MALAGARRIGA,.
LA UNIFICACION INTERNACIONAL DE LA LETRA DE CAMBIO 222 (Buenos Aires, 1916).
85
MARTINEZ ESCOBAR, LETRAS DE CAMBIO, LIBRANZAS, CHEQUES, VALES, y
PAGARES 169 (La Habana, 1929); l GARRIGUES, CuRSo DE DERECHO MERCANTIL
694 and 719 {Madrid, 1936).
ORTIZ y ARCE, 26 ENCICLOPEDIA JURIDICA ESPANOLA 283-284 (Barcelona,
1910), qualifies the case of France as "anomalous." He personally believes that protest
embodies a natural requisite which can be excused, as its renunciation is not contrary
to morals or public order and its omission could prejudice only the payee of the bill;
the same rule holds for the contract of exchange as for that of mutuum, of which
the former is a manifestation or instrument, if the waiver agreed upon be not motivated
by critical circumstances that limit freedom, as might happen to the drawee or even
to the drawer.
86
Cuba-C. Com., art. 509; cf. Fr.-C. Com., art. 175 et al. (see note 24,
supra).
Cuba-C. Com., art. 502. Cf. Fr.-C.Com., arts. n9, 162, and 163. See Dom.
-C. Com., arts. n9, 162, and 163; Haiti-C. Com., arts. n7, 159, and 160;.
Arg.-C. Com., arts. 665, 724; Bol.-C. Mere., art. 417; Parag.-C. Com., arts.
655, 724; Urug.-C. Com., arts. 850, 917.
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The second objection, the one that really gives typical character·
to this interpretation, is fully expounded by Martinez Escobar.37 He
states that in the Cuban legislation so-called "limited" bills are not
permitted. Non-protestable bills are not such bills; at least, they are
not perfect bills. They are no other than defective bills, or what is
the same, promissory notes in favor of the payee, on account of, the
drawer, in conformity with the principle contained in article 450 38 of
the Code of Commerce. He considers that the prohibition of protest, ·
a formality required by article 502 of the Code to prove nonacceptance
or nonpayment, is a primary defect in the bill, which places it wit.hin
the prescriptions of the said article 450.
What, then, is the position of the holder of such a "bill-note"? According to Martinez Escobar, if the drawer does not accept or pay the
bill, the holder cannot protest it; a stipulation of the contract, freely
contracted, precludes this. If, d~spite the prohibition, he does protest,
this has no e:ffect, having been done in contravention of what is agreed.
It is not la.;;,ful to exercise rights that have been expressly waived. The
bill cannot be considered to be prejudiced for want of protest. A bill
is prejudiced when the possessor, able and obliged to take it, omits this
step, that is, by an omission imputable to him; not when, by reason of
the contract, he is prohibited from taking it, when the very contract
itself .has imposed on him the obligation not to do so. Damages ensue
from infraction of what is agreed, never from perf9rmanee. What
rights and actions, then, will the holder, have? Consistently with what
has been, stated, he comes to the conclusion that, if the bill is not accepted. or paid, the payee and those who succeed him have no other
right than to demand of the drawer refund of the amount delivered or
- that compensation be made therefor in their accounts, without prejudice to the solidary liability of the endorsers if the "promissory note"
(by transformation) be of mercantile character.39
37

MARTINEZ EscoBAR, LETRAS DE CAMBIO, LIBRANZAS, CHEQUES, VALES, Y
PAGARES 169 (La Habana, 1929). Cf. 2 BLANCO, ESTuD1os ELEMENTALES DE DERECHO
MERCANTIL, 3d ed., 272 (Madrid, 1911):
"El efecto que a lo sumo podrfa darsele era dispensar al portador del protesto,
como se acord6 en el Congreso de Amberes."
38
"Si la lettra de cambio adoleciere de algun defecto o falta de formalidad legal,
se reputara pagare a favor del tomador y a cargo del librador." Cuba-C. Com. art.

450.
89
"Los pagares que proceden de operaciones de comercio son mercantiles; los
demas son civiles.
Par que aquellos lo scan, no basta que su · importe se destine a operaciones de
comercio. Lo que les caracteriza es su origen; no la aplicaci6n que se de a su valor."
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This was the view expressed by the Spanish Minister of Justice in
his reply to the questionnaire of the Hague Conference of 1910.40
At the Hague Conference of 1912, in the "Observations" of the
Spanish delegation,41 it was remarked that the clause under consideration is very useful, since as a general rule very few bills of exchange
can be protested in towns of slight importance, even if they are sent
there on that condition and there is a notary in the locality, because no
one wi:shes to place himself at odds with his'neighbor, and in practice
the result is that many bills are returned without satisfying this requirement. It was pointed out that in their Code of Commerce this type of
bill is not admitted, but that custom tolerates it, and the banks and individual bankers always reserve their liability in case such bills are not
protested for nonacceptance or nonpayment. The decisions of the courts,
although somewhat uncertain, seem also to incline in this direction.42
MARTINEZ EscoBAR, LETRAS DE CAMBIO, LIBRANZAS, CHEQUES, VALES, Y PAGARES 359
(La Habana, 1929).
Cf. Cuba-C. Com., art. 532. For actions against the endorsers of the note and
omission of protest, see MARTINEZ EscoBAR, id. 272.
40
cc. . . Si bien au moyen de ces expressions les lettres deviennent de veritables
billets a ordre." Conference de La Haye pour l'unification du droit relatif a la lettre
de change, de billet a ordre et "de cheque, 1910, Documents 234.
41
Deuxieme Conference de La Haye pour l'unification · du droit en maticre de
lettre de change, de billet a ordre, et de cheque, 191 2, 2 Actes 3 II.
42
1. Declaration of bankruptcy was sought of a drawer of certain bills with the
clause sans frais, which bills had not been protested.
The Supreme Court of Spain held that protest was not necessary to the validity
of the instrument in question, because this extrinsic requisite, although it grants certain
privileges, does not release the drawer from the obligation to satisfy the amount of the
bill, according to art. 483, and expenses according to art. 458, of the Code'of Commerce, it being sufficient, as stated in art. 460, in order for the obligation to exist,
that it had been presented for payment.
The court did not determine, deeming it a new and unnecessary question, whether
or not such instruments were "executory," since what was declared was sufficient
to satisfy the first of the requisites of article 876, par. 2, of the Code of Commerce,
which requires only that the instrument prove a debt and not that it be "executory."
Spain-T.S., Sen. No. 70, 8.V.1913, 127 Jur. Civil 433.
2. The notice stated: " ••. for further instructions consult Mr. - " (agent of
the drawer). The plaintiff alleges that Mr. - gave order not to protest.
Even supposing the notice to be an integral part of the bill ( to which it was
annexed), it cannot be given such scope as to excuse protest, being in conflict with
conclusive and obligatolo/ precepts of the Mercantile Code, such as articles 502 and the
like, and even supposing the contrary, the plaintiff bank would not have proved that
the person to whom it ascribed the order not to protest, gave it in due time. SpainT.S., Sen. No. 106, 18.IX.1927, 178 Jur. Civil 497 at 492.
3. A bill drawn to the order of a bank was discounted by the bank, which
credited the amount with the usual formula "S.B.F." (salvo buen fin).
It was held:
·
"Resultando que esta formula de abono subordina su eficacia y efectividad a que
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Pedro Huguet distinguishes the transforming effects of the stipulation, according to whether or not it appears on the bill. If it be
written or stamped on the face of the bill itself, the bill is transformed
into a mere promissory note to order.48 If it appears in a separate
document, as a special agreement between the drawer and the payee,
Huguet holds that the bill retains its character as a perfectly negotiable bill, and the only effect of the stipulation is that the payee by ·
signing the agreement is definitely precluded from demanding the
costs of protest from the drawer.44
(b) Favorable Opinions in the Doctrine. On the other hand, Gay
de Montella and Pifiol Agull6 45 fully admit bills containing the clause
sans protet, sans frais, or some other equivalent, and even bills assigned
la operaci6n se finalizara entre acreedor y deudor, sin quebranto ni detrimento para el
Banco que admitfa la letra para su cobro, de tal modo que si no lo lograba despues al
hacer las gestiones adecuadas, quedaba exento de responsibilidad y sin efecto el abono
en cuenta, con lo que no se infringe el articulo 2° del C6digo de Comercio, que en
nada se opone a los acuerdos y convenciones que puedan adoptarse entre el tomador y
librador sobre los efectos y responsabilidad, en su caso, si el librado no pagase, los
cuales, aun cuando no pudieran regularse por los preceptos mercantiles son Hcitos al
amparo de] C6digo Civil, y aunque no trasciendan a terceros que los desconocieran y
que en ellos no intervinieron, han de surtir sus efectos entre aquellos para los de las
cuentas que entre ellos mediasen y hacerse los abonos correspondientes, segun las condiciones del pacto complementario de] fundamental del cambio que representa Ia letra,
doctrina amparada en el articulo 1255 del C6digo Civil y en Ia sentencia de este
Tribunal de 20 de enero de 1905 .•• " Esp.-T.S., Sen. No. 62, 14.I.1928, 180
Jur. Civ. 387 v. 397.
48
"Si se consigna escribiendola 6 estampillandola en Ia cara de Ia misma cambial,
rige dicha clausula no solo para el tomador, sino para cuantas personas vayan adquiriendo
Ia letra, de suerte que nadie, en caso de protesto, puede reclamar al librador, ni a
endosante alguno, los gastos ocasionados; pero como quiera esto pugna abiertamente
con Ia naturaleza del contrato mercantil de cambio, de ahi que una letra limitada con
tal frase no goza con respecto al librador y endosantes genuino caracter de cambial, sino
que ha de reputarse mero pagare a la orden, y por las ]eyes de esta clase de documentos
debe regularse." HUGUET, LA LETRA DE CAMBIO 91.
44
"Mas si -la frase 'sin protesto' 6 'sin gastos' se consigna en documento aparte
como convenio particular entre librador y tomador, Ia letra conserva su caracter de
perfecta cambial, y de todos cuantas personas intervienen en su circulaci6n, solo el
tomador, firmante del expresado convenio, queda en definitiva privado de reclamar al
librador los gastos de protesto, ora los realice dicho tomador, ora se los haya exigido
algun endosatario; y decimos en definitiva, porque si llegase el caso de dirigirse dicho
tomador contra el librador pidiendole en juicio ejecutivo el reembolso de la letra y sus
gastos, el Juez despacharfa ejecuci6n incluyendo el importe de tales gastos sin que le
fuese dable al librador oponerse alegando Ia excepci6n de no pedir, y unicamente
terminado el juicio ejecutivo le cabria demander al tomador la indemnizaci6n procedente en juicio ordinario a tenor del particular convenio referido." Id. 91 ff.
45
GAY DE MONTELLA, ComGo DE CoMERCIO ESPANOL coMENTADo, tomo 3, vol.
2, 595-596 (Barcelona, 1936); PINOL AGULL6, CoMENTARIOs AL CODIGO MERCANTIL
ESPANOL, sEcc16N LETRA DE CAMBIO 369 (Madrid, 1939).
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to a banking entity, in whose invoice of discount the expression is
inserted': "The transferee entity [bank] accepts drafts without the
corresponding protests being made, if the drawee resires in a locality
without banking facilities." The only difference between the two forms,
according to Pifiol Agull6's observation,46 is that the first springs from
the intention of the drawer or assignor and appears on the bill itself,
while the second derives from the intention of the payee or assignee,
agreed to by the assignor, and appears in a separate document.
In commenting on article 460 of the Spanish Code of Commerce,
Pifiol Agull6 reads into this article,47 which appears to treat presentment as a condition distinct from protest, a tacit reference to bills of
exchange which, containing the designation sans frais, do not have to
be protested and need only to be presented.
(c) Opinion and Criticism of the Author. With the greatest respect for the authoritative opinions maintaining that inclusion of the
clause sans frais or some similar expression transforms a bill of exchange into a mere promissory note, the present writer believes it possible to support the contrary opinion, not only as being modern and the
more consistent with the imperious needs of commercial practice, which
should have sovereign control over the destiny of such legal rules, but
also since it is considered admissible pursuant to a mere correct inter- pretation of the pertinent legal principles.
Before attempting to interpret article 450, it is pertinent to distinguish the essential formal elements of bills of exchange, set forth in
the first section of Title X of the Spanish Code of Commerce, from
what may be termed the essential consequences of bills of exchange,
among which the action of recourse may be cited. Article 450, in question, undoubtedly refers to the former, the lack or default of one of
which will transform the bill into a promissory note.
Protest, in the second category, is no more than a condition precedent to the right of recourse or, at most, a formal, although today not
absolutely essential, element of that right. Thus, we see that an en46

Ibid.
"Cesara la responsabilidad de] librador cuando el tenedor de la letra no la
hubiere presentado o hubiere omitido protestarla en tiempo y forma • . ." CubaC. Com.,art. 460.
·
" • • • Si la presentaci6n debe preceder al protesto, en este art. no debfa de
decir sino, presentarla y . protestarla, • . • • Pero en esta redacci6n quedarian
pendientes las cambiales de] segundo apartado o sean de aquellas que por la indicaci6n
sin gastos, deben solo presentarse pero no protestarse, ya que en estas el protesto es
ocioso y basta la presentaci6n para salvaguardar los derechos del tenedor." Id. 143,
and citation to Spain-T.S., Sen. of 8.V.1913. See note 42, supra.
47
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dorser may cause this right of recourse to disapp.ear by inserting the
clause "without recourse," which the Code expressly authorizes,4 8 and
yet it is sought to deny him the right to waive what constitutes a mere
requisite or a mere condition of the same right of recourse.
( d) Procedural Difficulties. It should be observed that in Cuba,
in order to support an executory action against an acceptor, without the
necessity of prior acknowledgment of the signature,49 a difficulty is
encountered which does not pertain to substantiye law, to private law
( which, as has been stated, can be waived by the interested party), but
to the law of procedure. Contrary to the principle maintained by the
Argentine courts/ 0 the Supreme Court of Cuba has repeatedly held
that the law of procedure pertains to the domain of public law, and
that therefore its principles concern public order; 51 which means that
the parties cannot, by covenant among themselves, alter the operation
of the procedural law, that is, the fulfillment of the steps established
for each proceeding.52
In other words, the writer sees no obstacle in the law of procedure
that would prevent a judge from issuing execution against an endorser
or drawer who has previously acknowledged his signature, in case the
action is based on a bill of exchange, not protested but which contains
the clause sans frais inserted by the debtor.53 On the other hand, it
48 Cuba-C. Com., art. 467.
49
"La acci6n ejecutiva debera fundarse en un tftulo qne tenga aparejada
ejecuci6n.
"Solo tendran aparejada ejecuci6n los titulos siguientes: .•.
"2°. Cualquier documento privado que haya sido reconocido bajo juramento ante
el Juez competente para despachar ejecuci6n •.•
"4°. Las letras de cambio, sin necesidad de reconocimiento judicial respecto al
aceptante que no ,hubiere puesto tacha de falsedad a su aceptaci6n, al tiempo de
protestar la letra por falta de pago.••• " Cuba-L. Enj. Civil, art. 1427, incs. 2 and 4.
50
See note 3 2.
51
Cuba-T.S., Sen. No. 190, 27.XI.1933, 1933 J. al Dfa (Civil) 456; T.S.,
Sen. No. 133, 21.XI.1931, 1931 id. 281; cf. 1 DEL JuNco, DERECHO PROCESAL
CIVIL, 2d ed., 31-39 (La Habana, 1942).
52 Cuba-T.S., Sen. No. So, 4.VIII. 1923, 1923 J. al Dia (Civil) 277; cf. I DEL
,
JuNco, DERECHO PROCESAL c1v1L, 2d ed., 37-38 (La Habana, 1942).
53
L.Enj.Civil, art. 1427, supra note 48.
It might be alleged that article 521 of the Code of Commerce requires protest
as a requisite of execution, in the exercise of the right of recourse. This requisite is
not part of procedural law stricte sensu, since a non-protested bill [but not "prejudiced,"
see MARTINEZ ESCOBAR, LETRAS DE CAMBJO, LIBRANZAS, _VALES y PAGARES 249 ff. (La
Habana, 1929) ], like any other private document, can be subject to immediate execution, if the signature previously has been judicially acknowledged.
The Audiencia de La Habana has invariably held that bills that have lost executory
force, upon becoming prejudiced for failure to take the necessary steps, cannot recover
it by acknowledgement of-signature or debt, nor in any other way. Id. 210. Contra:
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does not appear possible for execution to issue against an acceptor who
.has not previously acknowledged his signature, if the complaint is not
accompanied by a protest, the only mode of proving in this stage of
the proceeding that the acceptor does not reject the acceptance as false.
The advantage granted to the plaintiff by the procedural law, of being
able to demand issue of execution against the acceptor without necessity
of prior acknowledgment of the signature, is a purely procedural
privilege, and is based on the guarantee, on the presumption of validity, that the protest, and only the protest, offers to the court. It has
been observed that the intention of the parties is powerless to modify
the rules of procedure.

4. Italian System (Brazil, El Salvador, and Peru)
The classic characteristic of this system is exemplified by the Italian
Code of Commerce of 1882, which declares that the clause sans protet
or sans frais, or any other clause that gives exemption from the obligation to protest, whoever may insert it, shall be treated as not written.
The advocates of this system 54 find the rationale of this position with
respect to such clauses, in the economic and legal nature of the bill of
exchange, which requires that the possibility to destroy, by agreements
contrary to the essence of the obligation, its guarantees and its legal
efficacy, which constitute the chief basis of negotiable credit, should not
be left to the discretion of the contracting parties. In America, the
laws of Brazil, 55 El Salvador, 56 and Peru 57 follow this criterion.
In spite of the express declaration in the law, Bonelli .'5 8 holds that
Arg.: 4 MALAGARRIGA, C6mco DE CoMERCio coMENTADo, 3d ed., 239 {Buenos Aires,
1928). Cf. Banco Nacional v. Jose Arosa, Cam.Fed.Ap.LaPlata, causa No. 21,
17.III.1905, 12 Fallos Cam.Fed.LaPlata 342; Cam.Ap.B.A., causa No. 79,
20.IX.1894, 38 J.Crim.Cor.Com. 169; but see Cam.Ap.B.A., Resol. No. 136,
17.VII.1894, 37 J.Crim.Cor.Com.93.
54
Report of Mancini and Pasquali to the Chamber of Deputies, 23.VI.1881,
Relaz. Parlam. XXXVII. 2 LAVOR1, PREP., {la.pt.) 203, cited by 3 V1vANTE, TRATADO
DE DERECHO MERCANTIL 427, note I (Madrid, 1936). Cf. BoNELLI, DELLA
CAMBIALE, DELL'ASSEGNO BANCARIO E DEL CONTO CORRENTE 501, note 2 (Milano,
1930); 12 R1v.D.CoM. (la. pt.) 734, note I {It., 1914); DE LA LAMA, CoDIGO DE
CoMERCIO 91 {Lima, 1902).
55
Bra.-Dec. 2044, art. 44, II.
56
El Sal.-C. Com., art. 448.
57
Peru-C. Com., art. 497, which follows the Code of Commerce of Italy. See
Exp'osici6n de motivos, DE LA LAMA, C6mco DE CoMERCIO 91 {Lima, 1902).
58
BONELLI, DELLA CAMBIALE, DELL'ASSEGNO BANCARIO E DEL CONTO CORRENTE
502, § 259 and note I {Milano, 1930). But Vivante admits that the Italian decisions
have distinguished between a waiver stipulated outside of the bill and one stipulated
on the bill itself, admitting the former and declaring the latter void. And even more
recently ( I 907), the Court of Cassation of Turin qualified this distinction as "illogical
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the principle characterizing the clause as nonexistent can and should
· be interpreted to mean that, when inserted in the bill, it has no greater
effect than the identical statement _would have, if made in a separate
document. That is, its effect is limited to the personal relations between
its author and the holder; he cites as an example, by analogy, the interest clause, which also is regarded as not written in the same sense.
He explains that apart from the bill such declaration has effect, not
against any possessor (holder), but against the party with whom the
waiver has pe~n agreed; wherefrom it results that, in his opinion, a
, clause inserted in the bill· has greater effect than one stipulated in a
separate document. On this account, he is criticized by Navarrini,59 who
reflects that, if the declaration should really be valid as against any
holder, how could it be said that it must be deemed not written?
Vivante 60 admits that, if the stipulation was in a separate document, it might be ~ffective, not for the purposes of an action or execution on the bill, which is not available, but for an action on the
agreement to pay the bill even though protest be omitted.
Bonelli 61 goes still further, holding that the clause has a derogatory effect and that the obligation and the right under negotiable
instruments law exist without the protest, which only assures exercise
of the action. Accordingly, the action is not an ordinary action, but an
action o~ the bill ( acci6n ~ambiaria).
Navarrini 62 likewise criticizes Vivante since he denies the action
on the bill to one who did not protest on account of the clause, and
limits the action which he may bring to an ordinary action. He considers that there is involved, in effect, no more than a waiver excluding
a d~fense under negotiable instruments law, and that there is no reason
. why the action should not continue to be based on this law, without
such defense. He explains that the law does not intend, by the action
on the bill ( acci6n cambiaria), to hold ( colpire) parties secondarily
liable if protest has not been made, but anyone may renounce the
and absurd," declaring the waiver to be equally invalid in both cases.

3

V1vANTE,

TRATADO DE DERECHO MERCANTIL 427, note 1 (Madrid, 1936).
59
3 NAVARRINI, TRATrATO TEORICO PRATICO DI DIRITrO COMMERCIALE 532,
note ·2 (Roma, 1917).
60 3 V1vANTE, TRATADO DE DERECHO MERCANTIL 427, No. 1318 (Madrid,

1936).
61

504,

BONELLI, DELLA CAMBIALE, DELL' ASSEGNO BANCARIO E DEL CONTO CORRENTE

note

BANCARIO
62

2

3 (Milano, 1930);
353 (Torino, 1931).

3 NAVARRINI,
1917).

(Roma,

contra: SUPINO, DELLA CAMBIALE E DELL'ASSEGNO

TRATrATO TEORICO PRATICO DI DIRITrO COMMERCIALE

532,

note

,.
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benefits of the law. The validity of the clause being thus reduced to
the ;elations between the contracting parties as a bar to a defense of the
debtor, Navarrini opposes the position of Supino,63 who enunciates the
maxim that what is outside the bill can have.no effect under negotiable
instruments law.
In his Trattato 64 and in his more modern work, La cambiale e
l'assegno bancario, secondo la nuova legislazione,65 Navarrini concludes
that the principle in question means that the clause is not valid for the
purposes of the law of negotiable instruments, that it cannot pass the
right to invoke it to a third-party holder, proceeding against whoever
inserted such clause, without making the protest that would otherwise
be necessary; nor to the one who inserted the clause the right to charge
the former with the corresponding costs and damages which might
have been occasioned by making protest. But, on the other h;md, Navarrini holds that this does not mean that an agreement on the point
should not be deemed valid, whether or not it appears on the instrument; anyone can renounce the protection that the law assures him,
wherefore the holder, with whom the one who inserted the clause has
contracted, can prove its existence and resist the corresponding defense.
Vice versa, he may be liable to bear the costs and damages of a protest
which, without special reason, notwithstanding the agreement, he may
have caused to be drawn.
Against these interpretations, especially that of Vivante, Stradelli 66
claims that a bill of exchange cannot, at the option of the holder, be
collected by an action other than that peculiar to it, so as to validate a
clause that must be deemed not written and always void.
Pontes de Miranda 67 holds that the provision which deems such
clause to be not written does not have an absolute effect; it should, on
the contrary, be interpreted in a manner in harmony with the customs
and needs of commerce, in the sense that the declaration should be
considered as not written for purposes under negotiable instruments
63

Ibid.
Id. 531, § 1312.
65
NAVARRINI, U CAMBIALE E L'ASSEGNO BANCARIO, SECONDO LA NUOVA LEGIS-LAZIONE 187, note 1 (Bologna, 1937).
The clause sans protet stipulated in writing, apart from its effects under negotiable
instruments law, is effective for the relations between the endorser and the endorsee
who have so stipulated. Cassazione Torino, 30.XII.1891, 17 Foro It. (la. pt., 1892)
64

416.
66
Stradelli, "Das clausulas que se consideram nao escriptas," 49 REv.D. (Bra.)
529 (1918).
67
PONTES DE MIRANDA, DIREITO CAMBIARIO, LA LETRA DE CAMBIO 350, § 37
(Rio de Janeiro, 1937).
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law, but that, as between the parties who so stipulated, it should have
full validity with the ordinary effects of a common contract.
Paulo de Lacerda ~8 is also of the same opinion. He explains that,
if such a clause were the object of a separate agreement, the bill would
not be affected by it, being a formal and complete instrument. A
clause that the law deems not written when included in the bill,
a fortiori, is regarded as void for the purposes of the law of negotiable
jnstruments, for it would thus tend to prejudice the rigorous principles of negotiability as respects the form. and the integrity of the
instrument.
But he adds that the owner of the bill may, nevertheless, prohibit
his agent from protesting it, or may give restrictive instructions to that
effect. He is master of whether or not it is protested and suffers the
consequences. However, wherever the clause may be written, even if
in a restrictive endorsement, it would have no effect on the relations
arising on the bill: neither can the official refuse to make the protest,
nor can any party liable avail himself of it; its existence is only in the,
relations not derived from the bill between principal and agent. The
Brazilian decisions seem to follow the reasoning of Pontes de Miranda
and Paulo de Lacerda.69
At the Hague Conference of I 9 ro, in answering the pertinent inquiry in the Questionnaire,7° only two countries opposed the admissibility of this clause, Italy, 71 and Portugal. 12 Brazil, 73 in answering,
limited itself to pointing out that in its legislation such stipulations
68

LACERDA, A CAMBIAL NO DIREITO BRASILEIRO 285,

§ 290 (Rio de Janeiro,

1921).
69
The clause sans frais has no effect under negotiable instruments law. Trib.
Justicia S. Paulo, Ac. 5.VIl,1918, 26 Rev.T. 494, cited by 5 CARVALHO DE MENDON!;,A, TRATADO DE DIREITO COMMERCIAL BRASILIERO, 3d ed., 2a pt., 261, note 4
(Rio de Janeiro, 1938).
.
By letter, or, in general, separately, it is valid as an agreement, with the for. malities of the ordinary law. C. de Apelaci6n S. Paulo, 31.VII.1935, cited by PoNTES
DE MIRANDA, DIREITO CAMBIARIO, LA LETRA DE CAMBIO 350, note I (Rio de Janeiro,
1937).
7
° Conference de La Haye pour !'unification du droit relatif a la lettre de change,
1910, Documents 343.
71
Id. 2, question 5( f) •
72
Id. 267.
78
Id. 200.
It is to be noted that neither the Unite'd States (id. So) nor Chile (id. 207)
referred to this question in their answers; the other American countries that replied to
this questionnaire answered this question in the affirmative, Argentina, id. 94; Bolivia,
id. 196; Haiti, id. 261; Paraguay, id. 338. ,
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were considered as not included. In the discussion of the various sections, Brazil, Italy, and Portugal voted against admission.u
In anticipation of the Geneva Convention of 1930, the Rome International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, remarked in its
report to its governing board, that, although acceptance of such clause
was approved, it was doubted whether it would be admitted by states
in which the invalidity of the phrase sans protet was determined also
by considerations of a fiscal nature. 75 At the Geneva Convention, Portugal supported the text approved at The Hague, considering it superior
to its own system, 76 and it was the Italian delegation itself that drafted
and presented the motion approved as the official text. 77

5. "Statutory" System
This system, which we have arbitrarily called "statutory" in default of a better term, is characterized by the fact that in its positive
law it expressly accepts and regulates the scope and effects of the waiver
clause.
(a) Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama,· and the United
States. Because of their common Anglo-American source, Canada, the
United States, Colombia, Panama, and Costa Rica 78 form a group or
"family" within this system. The North American writer, Daniel,79
justifies the admissibility of waiver clauses, stating that when the protest has been waived by agreement of the parties, it would be a fraud
upon the holder if he were made to suffer for having acted upon the
assurance given by the party to whom he looks as guarantor of the
instrument. And since the :8rotest is a requirement solely for the benefit of the drawer and endorsers, they alone are the judges to determine
whether they should require it or not.
Attention should be drawn- to the fact that, in referring to waiver
of protest, Anglo-American writers generally do so with reference to
waiver of presentment and notice, and sometimes only to waiver of
74

Second section (Brazil and ltaly) id. 212; fourth section (Portugal) id. 253.

76

L. OF N. No. C.234.M.83.1929.II, International Conference for the Unifica-

tion of the Laws on Bills of Exchange, Promissory Notes, and Cheques, Preparatory
Documents 130.
76
L. OF N. No. C.360.M.151.1930.II, id., Records 295 (M. de Mata).
77
Id. 296 ff.
78 Can.-B.E.A., ss. 34, 110, 106(b); U.S.-N.I.L., ss. 159, 109, 110, III;
Col.-Ley 46 de 1923, art. 160, 111, 112, 113; Pan.-Ley 52 de 1917, arts. 159,
109, 110, 111; C.R.-L. Cam., arts. 18, 51, 130; cf. Eng.-B.E.A., ss. 16(2),
51(9), 50(2).
.
79
2 DANIEL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 7th ed.,
1304 (New York, 1933).
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presentment, although it is understood that what is said equally applies
to waiver of protest. 8 ° Frequently, especially in the decisions of the
courts, references are found to promissory notes, which in this respect
are equivalent to bills of exchange. For this reason and in the interest
of uniformity, the term "drawee" has been substituted herein for
"maker," when referring to the person to whom the bill must be presented and against whom the protest must be made.
(b) Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.
Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Venezuela 81 belong
to the'"family" of the Hague Uniform Regulation of 1912, which has
also been followed by the Geneva Uniform Law and by the Yadarola
Project (Argentina).82
( c) Chile. Chile 88 limits itself to express admission, without reference to the scope or effects of the clause. Although article 460 refers
only to a clause agreed upon by the drawer and the payee, it is the
writer's opinion that insertion by an endorser is equally possible.84
( d) Mexico. Mexico 85 follows the principle advocated by the
Committee of Legal Experts of the League of Nations,86 which was
so So DANIEL states, ibid.
"Protest is dispensed with by any circumstances which would dispense with notice
of dishonor." N.I.L., s. I 59.
Cf. Can.-B.E.A., s. 110; Cot---Ley 46 de 1923, art. 160; Pan.-Ley 52 de
1917, art. 159; Eng.-B.E.A., s. 51(9); C.R.-L.Cam., art. 130.
81
Ec.-L. de 5.XII.1925, art. 45; Guat.-C. Com., arts. 621 and 710; Hon.C. Com., arts. 589 and 596; Nic.-C. Com., art. 644; Ven.-C. Com., art. 459.
Cf. La Haye-R.U., art. 45.
82
Gen.-L.U., art. 46; lNSTITUTO ARGENTINO DE Esnrmos LEGISLATivos,
Publicaci6n No. 6, Proyecto art. 50, at pp. 30 and 123.
88
"El librador y tomador pueden acordar las clausulas devuelta sin gastos, sin mas
aviso y otras e:xpresivas de pactos accessorios que no alteren la esencia del contracto"
Chile-C. Com., art. 64<;>.
1 DAVIS, LA LETRA DE CAMBI0 191 (Santiago de Chile, 1928); 2 PALMA,
DERECRo COMERCIAL 326 (Santiago de Chile, 1940).
La declaraci6n del girador de una letra, extendida al dorso de ella, en los
siguientes terminos: "sin considerarse esta letra en ningun caso perjudicada," equivale
a una renuncia de su derecho para declararla a perjudicada, y el tenedor tiene acci6n
contra el librador y endosantes para hacerlos solidariamente responsables de su valor. Sen.
No. 483, 1915 (2do. semestre) G. T. 1797.
84
1 DAVIS, LA LETRA DE CAMBIO 191 (Santiago de Chile, 1928). Although he
mentions only article 640, the present writer believes that support could well be found
in the express provision of article 66 5: "El endosante y endosatario pueden celebrar
convenios que modifiquen los efectos juridicos del endoso." Chile-C.Com. art. 665.
85
Mex.-L.Gen.Tit.Op.Cr., art. 141. Cf. 2 TENA, DERECRO MERCANTIL
MEXICANO, -zd ed., 344, § 233 (Mexico, 1938).
86
Dom.-C. Com., art. 45; L. OF N. No. C.175.M.54.1928.II, Committee of
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endorsed by the International Chamber of Commerce,87 admitting and
regulating the clause when inserted by the drawer and declaring it not
written when included by an endorser.

II
PERSONAL SCOPE

One of the most debated problems in the practical application of
the clause in negotiable instruments dispensing with protest has undoubtedly been that of determining its effects as respects the persons
who have so agreed, or who, in one way or another, have intervened in
the circulation of the bill. Even in the cases in which the positive laws
have sought to solve the problem, both the parties and the courts themselves have been confused by diverse and conflicting interpretations.
With a view to facilitating analysis and comparison of the numerous
solutions and principles, the writer has grouped them into "systems,"
without attempting to establish an absolute classification, but merely in
order to simplify the discussion.

English System ( Canada, Costa Rica)
The English writers concur in noting the absolutely personal or
autonomous character of the waiver clause. Its effect is strictly limited
to parties participating therein and does not extend to other parties to
the bill.88 Therefore, it does not affect endorsers of the instrument,
despite the fact that the clause appears in the text itself of the bill. 89
It is to be noted that the English Act contains no provision similar to
sections r ro and r r r of the Negotiable Instruments Law, while, on the
other hand, section r6 of the English legislation clearly indicates that
I.

Legal Experts on Bills of Exchange and Cheques, Report to the Economic Committee
II.
87

L. OF N. No. C.234.M.83.1929.II, International Conference for the Unification of the Law of Bills of Exchange, Promissory Notes, and Cheques, Preparatory
Documents 122. Report of M. Albert Troullier.
88
BYLES, A TREATISE oN THE LAw OF BILLS OF ExcHANGE, PROMISSORY NoTEs,
AND CHEQUES, 19th ed., 252 (London, 1931); Chalmers, A DIGEST OF THE LAW
OF BILLS OF ExcHANGE, PROMISSORY NoTEs, CHEQUES, AND NEGOTIABLE SECURITIES,
10th ed., 46 (London, 1932); cf. STORY, CoMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BILLS OF
ExcHANGE, 3d ed., 326 (Boston, 1853); BONELLI, DELLA CAMBIALE, DELL'ASSEGNO
BANCARIO E DEL CONTRATTO DI CONTO CORRENTE 501, note 3 (Milano, 1930);
semble contra CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON B1LLS OF EXCHANGE, CHECKS ON
BANKERS, PROMISSORY NoTEs, AND BANK NoTEs, 12th ed., American, 189 (Springfield, I 8 54).
89
BYLES, ibid.
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such waiver does not affect the rights of any party who does not expressly assent thereto. 90 Even at an earlier date, Chalmers 91 had
pointed out that it was very doubtful whether the English law would
admit the interpretation given to such clauses in the United States and
in France.
In Canada, the same principle has been maintained by Falconbridge,92 based on the expression "as regards himself," which, as in
the English Act, appears in section 34(b) of the Canadian law; writers
· and courts agree on this. 93 The Costa Rican Ley de Cambio, which
appears to be derived from the English Act and the French Code of
Commerce, follows the English law on this point.94
In Germany, the clause exonerates only the party who inserted it
( according to the commentators on article 42 of the German law and
the invariable practice 95 ) . And this was the point of view adopted in
the project submitted by N orsa for the consideration of the I nstitut de
Droit International at its meeting in Brussels in 1885.96

United States System ( United States, Colombia, and Panama)
Under this system, a distinction must be made between a clause
inserted by the drawer in the text of ~he instrument or in any other
place on its face, and one placed on the back by any other party. In the
2.

00
"The drawer of a bill and any endorser, may insert therein an express stipulation: ••• (2) Waiving as regards himself, some or all of the holder's duties." Eng.B.E.A., s. 16.
91
CHALMERS, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE, PROMISSORY
NoTES, CHEQUES, .AND NEGOTIABLE SECURITIES, 10th ed., 46 (London, 1932).
92
FALCONBRIDGE, THE LAW OF BANKS AND BANKING, BILLS, NoTEs, AND
CHEQUES, 5th ed., 565 (Toronto, 1935).
93
Cf. 3 PERRAULT, TRAITE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL 758 (Montreal, 1940);
'IyrAcLAREN, B1LLs, NoTEs, AND CHEQUES, 6th ed., 108 (Toronto, 1940); Banque de,
St, Jean v. Desmarais, 17 R.DEJ.(Que.) 304 (1910).
9
<1. "El librador puede insertar en la letra 1a expressa estipulaci6n de qui niega
o limita su responsabilidad con respecto al tenedor, o de que renuncia con respecto al
mismo librador todos o algunos de los deberes del tenedor." C.R.-L.Cam., art. 18.
95
PINERO, LA LETRA CAMBIO ANTE EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO, 2d
ed., 272 (Buenos Aires, 1932); 2 WILLIAMS, LA LETRA DE CAMBIO
EN LA DOCTRINA,
1
LEGISLACION 'Y JURISPRUDENCIA 36 (Buenos Aires, 1930); GmE, FLACH, LYoNCAEN, AND DIETZ, CoDE DE COMMERCE ALLEMAND ET LOI ALLEMANDE SUR LE
CHANGE 409, note 2 (Paris,, 1881).
96 Report of M. Norsa, "Conflit des lois et unification internationale en matiere
de lettres de change et autres papiers transmissibles par endossement," 7 AN.lNsT.D.lNT.
53 at 73 (Belgium, 1885).
Annex I, "Principes et regles en vue de la redaction d'une Joi uniforme en
matiere de lettre de change et autres papiers negociables," art. 38. Id. at 8 5; see question 53 of the questionnaire, Annex II, i4. at 95.
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first case, as Bonelli 97 points out, the United States system is closer to
the French than to the English, since not only the drawer but all subsequent endorsers are covered. Incorporated in the instrument itself,
the clause forms part of the contract of each party who signs, whether
the drawer, acceptor, or endorser, who are in effect new drawers. Such
is the case even if the endorsee knew that the drawee had sufficient
funds on deposit to pay the bill at maturity. 98 The law clearly provides
that when the waiver is embodied in the instrument itself, it is binding
upon all parties.00 Nevertheless, Mackenzie,1° 0 commenting upon
article 112 of the Negotiable Instruments Law of Colombia, holds
that, if the drawer uses a form book, like those now common, and one
of the endorsers at the time of transfer expressly demands that notice
be given him, article 112 will not strictly apply, since a subsequent
holder in case of dishonor of the bill will have to give n_otice thereof to
such endorser, under penalty of discharging him. He adds that the
clause inserted by such endorser and accepted by the subsequent taker,
is a condition that the latter must respect, among other reasons because
it comes within the sphere of autonomy of contract.
In this system, there arises the problem of determining the scope of
the clause when inserted by an endorser. Prior to the Negotiable Instruments Law the principle of the common law was that -a clause endorsed
on the instrument covered all endorsers unless they were expressly
excluded,101 although a small minority considered it limited to the
endorser immediately below .102
·
91 BoNELLI, DELLA CAMBIALE, DELL' ASSEGNO BANCARIO E DEL CONTRATTO DI!
CONTO CORRENTE 501, note 3, at 502 (Milano, 1930).
98
2 DANIEL, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 7th ed.,.
1306, § 1257; cf. Appleton v. McCarthy, 104 N. J. L. 431, 140 A. 918 (1928).
99
''Where the waiver is embodied in the instrument itself, it is binding upon
all parties •••• " U.S.-N.I.L., s. I IO.
"Cuando la mencionada excusa esta en el instrumento mismo, obliga a todas las
partes••••" Col.-L. 46 de 1923, art. -II2.
Mackenzie uses the expression, which is more exact, "poner en el cuerpo mismo
del instrumento." DocTRINA y JURISPRUDENCJA DEL DERECHO CAMBIARIO COLOMBIANO
108 (Bogota, 1934).
"Cuando la renuncia estuviese consignada en el documento mismo, sera obligatoria
para todas las partes .••" Pan.-L. 52 de 1917, art. I IO.
lOO MACKENZIE, ibid.
101
BIGELOW, THE LAW OF BILLS, NoTEs, AND CHECKS, 3d ed., 338 (Boston,
1928); CHALMERS, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE, PROMISSORY
NoTES, CHEQUES, AND NEGOTIABLE SECURITIES, 10th ed., 46 (London, 1932); 26
MICH. L. REV. 570 (1928).
102
2 RANDOLPH, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF CoMMERCIAL PAPER, 2d ed.,
1989, § 1364 (St. Paul, 1899); BIGELOW, ibid.
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As Bigelow 103 points out, the meaning of the provision in section
r IO 104 is not clear, and has _suffered conflicting interpretations. The
problem is to determine whether the clause represents an effort to
eliminate difficulties of the unwritten law ( common law) supra, or
whether the section in unhappy phraseology refers to the accepted rule '
that a waiver in the body of the instrument binds all parties but, when
not incorporated in the instrument, does not bind endorsers whose signatures precede the waiver; or, on the other hand, whether the clause
is to be limited solely to the endorser whose signature appears immediately below.
·
In studying the interpretation of the so-called uniform laws,105 a
. constant tendency is to be found, on the part of judges and writers, to
interpret the positive text in terms of common law principles, despite
the fact that these texts were enacted as specific statutes in each state.100
Thus, Williston 101 appears to hold that, although the word "embodied" is not free from ambiguity, it would seem that a printed or
written waiver clause anywhere on the instrument should be considered
within the meaning of the term, especially since this was the customary
interpretation at common law. And he adds that the fact that one
endorsement appears after another scarcely can be said to take the
lower endorsement out of this section, since a negotiable instrument is
rarely so complex a document that an endorser cannot readily take
account of its terms when he signs. Moreover, a holder in due course
should have the protection the words import of themselves, and should
103

BIGELOW, ibid.; cf. 30 MICH. L. REv. 965 (1932); Vernier, "Amendments

to the Negotiable Instruments Law," 24 ILL. L. REV. 150 at 165 (1930).
104 " • • • but where it is written above the signature of an endorser, it binds
him only." U.S.-N.I.L., s. l IO.
" •.. pero cuando se hallare escrita sobre la firma de un endosante, la renuncia
obligara a ·este solamente." Pan.-L. 52 de 1917, art. IIO.
" . • . cuando esta escrita encima de la firma de un endosante, solo obliga a
este." Col.-L. 46 de 1923, art. 112.
105 For the works of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, which met for the first time in l 892 and in its first forty years of existence prepared some seventy draft laws, of which fifty-three were included in the list
approved in 1933, see NATIONAL CoNFERENCE OF CoMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK 465-467, 503-518 (1933).
See also AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF BANKING, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 302378 (New York, 1941), for the text of the Negotiable Instruments Law with the
modifications introduced in each state in its legislation. No state has modified the
wording of section l IO, id. 349.
.
.
100 21 MicH. L. REv. 697 (1923); 7 MINN. L. REv. 343 (1923); and citations
in 8 C. J. 47·
107 4 WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CoNTRACTS, 2d ed., 3408,
§ n86 (New York, 1936).
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not, at his peril, have to decide whether he must give notice to one of
the endorsers.
Daniel 108 remarks that there are various cases in which the courts
of the state of Maine have held that, where the first endorser wrote a
waiver of protest above his signature, subsequent endorsers who merely
appended their signatures were bound by the clause, and that, if a
subsequent endorser desired to exempt himself from its operation, he
should add a statement to that effect, e.g., "requiring demand and
notice."
Bigelow 100 attempts to find justification for this interpretation in
the text itself, by extending the meaning of the term "endorser," in the
singular, to the plural as well. And he questions whether in reality the
clause is not written or printed 110 above the signatures of the second
and successive endorsers as well as over the signature of the endorser
immediately below.
Among the commentators on the Colombian law, Cock 111 interprets
this section as indicating that the clause cannot be given effect in prejudice of third parties; i.e., if the waiver is above the signature of an
endorser, it binds him only and not the antecedent parties, by which he
seems to admit, e contrario, that it should bind subsequent parties.
Others have endeavored to introduce a distinction between written
and printed clauses, in spite of the fact that it openly conflicts with the
principle of interpretation stated in section r 9 I of the Negotiable In108
2 DANIEL, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 7th ed.,
1308 (New York, 1933); cf. Confidential Finance Co. v. Monastersky 106 N. J. L.
14, 148 A. 183 (1930); 15 Bus. L. J. 434 (June, 1930). It is clearly stated that
in section no, "written above," does not mean immediately above or next to the signature; that at no time has the law sought to require a waiver clause for each endorser.
The case involved three endorsers who signed simultaneously in order to induce the
plaintiff to receive the -instrument. It was maintained that the clause bound all three.
BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW ANNOTATED, 6th ed., 942 (Cincinnati, 1938) approves this decision, since it involves the very parties to the original
agreement. Even 2 DANIEL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS,
7th ed., 1308 (New York, 1933), who skilfully defends the contrary opinion, admits
that this rule does not endeavor to require a separate clause for each endorser but
recognizes the fact that several may sign under a waiver clause with intent to
be bound by it.
109
BIGELOW, THE LAw OF BILLS, NOTES, AND CHECKS, 3d ed., 338 (Boston,
1928); contra Norton, 10 BosT. UNIV. L. REv. 527 at 528 (1930), who characterizes
this interpretation as "tortuous": "such construction is tortuous to an excessive degree."
110 He believes that where "written" is stated, "printed" is equally included,
since "It is improbable that section I IO uses the term 'written' in contradistinction to
'printed,' in view of the provision of section 191 that 'written' includes printed, and
'writing' includes print." BIGELOW, id. 339, note.
111
CocK, DERECHO CAMBIARIO COLOMBIANO 158 (Bogota, 1933).
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struments Law. 112 Daniel 113 cites Mr. Justice Morris of the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals as making this distinction, in order to
arrive at the condusion that, when the formula or clause is found
printed on the back of the bill and their signatures are located in connection therewith, the endorsers are presumed to have seen and read
the words and to have adopted them in their contracts.
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire i u has decided that where
both endorsers sign below the clause as a part of the same transaction,
the second endorser is equally bound. And Williston m goel> even
further, holding that it should make no difference whether or not the
endorsers sign at the same time, provided the clause appears on the
instrument at the time when the endorser's signature is placed thereon.
The subtleties have reached the extreme of distinguishing between
a clause in the handwriting of the first subsequent endorser and one in
· another's handwriting, and also between clauses expressed in the singular and in the plural 116 The American Institute of Banking 117 deems it

1

112

'

See note I Io, supra; cf.:
"En esta ley, a menos que el texto de otra manera lo requiera, el significado de
los terminos a continuad6n es el siguiente: . . . 'Escrito' incluye lo impreso, y 'lo
escrito' incluye lo que haya sido objeto de impresi6n." Pan.-Ley 52 de 1917, article
191.
Curiously, the Colombian Ley de Instrumentos Negociables failed to enact these
general provisions contained in title IV of the Negotiable Instruments L;tw and the
Ley de Documentos Negociables of Panama.
118 2 DANIEL, A TREATISE oN THE LAw OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 7th ed.,
1308, note 8 (New York, 1933); cf. BIGELOW, THE. LAW OF BILLS, NoTES, AND
CHECKS, 3d ed., 338 (Boston, 1928), who admits this solution in spite of not accepting the distinction between writing and print. See note I 10, supra.
Cf. National Bank of Portsmouth v. Sciotoville Milling Co., 79 W. Va. 782, 91
S. E. 808 ( I 917). This refers to several persons who, before delivery to the payee,
at the same time and in regular order sign under the printed form, but in its decision
the court generalizes the interpretation to include all who sign below.
Contra: First National Bank of Medford v. Wolfson, 271 Mass. 292, 171 N.E.
460 (1930); IO BosT. UNiv. L. REv. 527 (1930). The decision is based on section
191 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, Mass. Gen. L. c. 107, s. 18 (1932).
Attleboro Trust Co. v. Johnson, 282 Mass. 463, 185 N.E. 19 (1933), ratifies
the principle but admits evidence to show the intention of the second endorser to make
the clause his own.
114
Record v. Rochester Trust Co., 89 N.H. 1, 192 A. 177 (1937), IIO A.L.R.
1218 and note (1937); criticized in 4 UNiv. PITT. L. REv. 50 (1937). The stipulation was written before delivery to the first endorser.
115
4 W1L"LISTON, TREATISE ON THE LAw OF CoNTRAiCTS, 2d ed., 3409, § I 186,
note 12 (New York, 1936).
116
B1GELow, THE LAw OF BILLS, NoTEs, AND CHECKS, 3d ed., 338 (Boston,
1928).
111 AMERICAN lNsTITUTE OF BANKING, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 147 (New
York, 1941); nevertheless, in the case of Public Investment Co. v. Stafford, (La. App.
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possible for a clause to affect all endorsers despite its being written on
the back of the instrument, e.g., "All endorsers of this instrument
waive notice."
Sometimes the mere placement of the clause has served to determine whether the courts deem it •effective or not with regard to a particular endorser. Bigelow 118 points out that the law probably does not
intend to exclude a clause written by an endorser immediately below
his signature, as where, for example, the payee in discounting the instrument writes below his signature, "protest waived," a not uncom,mon
practice.
In the case of an endorser who has signed at right angles to the
clause, commencing his signature in juxtaposition thereto, the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island 119 held that he had made the clause his own.
On the contrary, the Supreme Court of Michigan 120 held that an endorser was not bound by a clause printed, not above the signature of
the defendant, but on some other part of the bill.
The most important case, not only since it is the one generally cited
as declaratory of the scope of the law and accepted by the majority of
the writers, but also because it contains the most complete discussion
of the interpretation of section I IO of the Negotiable Instruments
Law, is undoubtedly that of Mooers v. Stalker. 121 A clause excusing
presentment, protest, and notice had been printed on the back of the
instrument. Below it appeared three endorsements, made by the payee
and two transferees. The majority of the Supreme Court of Iowa held
1940) 195 S. 817, the clause read: ''We, the endorsers of this note do ... waive protest thereof," and had been signed by the original taker; it was held that the waiver was
not applicable to persons who subsequently endorsed the instrument, although the clause
was in the plural.
118
BIGELOW, THE LAW OF BILLS, NoTEs, AND _CHECKS, 3d ed., 340 (Boston,
1928).
119
Costello Brothers v. Buckley, 50 R.I. 432, 148 A. 414 (1930).
120
People's National Bank of Ypsilanti v. Dicks, 258 Mich. 441, 242 N.W.
825 (1932) ..
Cf. Stuhldreher v. Dannemiller, 26 Ohio App. 388, 158 N.E. 556 (1927);
2 UNiv. Cm. L. REv. 100 (1928); 12 MINN. L. REv. 287 (1928); 26 MICH. L.
REV. 570 (1928). The endorsements were written at the end of the instrument
opposite the clause printed _on the back, suchwise that the clause was upside down
and under the endorsements. It was held that it did not bind the endorsers.
121
Mooers v. Stalker, 194 Iowa 1354, 191 N.W. 175 (1922); 2 DANIEL, A
TREATISE ON THE LAw OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 7th ed., 1307, note 6 (New
York, 1933).
For a detailed study of the cases and decisions on this matter subsequent to the
Negotiable Instruments Law, see a comment in 18 BosT. UNiv. L. REv. 154-169
(1938).
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that the third endorser was not a party to the clause in question and
that therefore it did not bind him; that the old and differing rule of
the common law existing in Iowa had been modified by section I IO
of the Negotiable Instruments Law, which they interpreted in the
sense that, to be able to give any meaning to the second clause, the first
had to be limited to waivers appearing on the face of the instrument.
Two judges did not agree to _the opinion of the majority, holding that
the waiver under consideration was "embodied in the terms of the
instrument itself" and therefore bound all parties. They deemed the
distinction contemplated by the two clauses of section I IO to be one of
time and not of place, and that the first referred to waivers introduced
before the instrument left the hands of the drawer and ·the second
regarded those added thereafter.122 The majority opinion has been
considered to be more in harmony with the spirit of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, which on this point sought to amend the rule of the
common law, and better from the practical point of view.123
As Daniel 124 most correctly points out, when the clause is not embodied in the instrument itself, but is made by one of the endorsers
who writes some appropriate expression above his signature, the better
opinion is that the excuse relates solely to the individual above whose
signature it appears and does not bind others who do not make themselves parties thereto. And he bases this on the consideration that an
endorsement is a separate and independent contract, embodying, it is
true, the terms of the bill, but not by implication embodying the terms
of other endorsements; each endorsement speaks independently of
122
The minority qpinion is defended in 21 MICH. L. REv. 697 (1923) and
7 MINN. L. REv. 343 (1923).
123
ln 8 lowA L. BULL. 265 (1923), it is pointed out that it would permit the
admissibility of extrinsic evidence to show at what moment the written waiver was
placed in the instrument, which would produce uncertainty on the part of the holder
at the instant of maturity, since he would not have assured knowledge whether or not
he should present for collection, protest, and give notice; whereas the view of the
majority would provide definite objective proof.
Cf. Sawyer, 4 UNiv. PITT. L., REv. 50 (1937), who defends the very desirable
principle that a negotiable instrument should tell its own story, and considers that the
genesis of the present conflict is to be found in the decisions prior to the Negotiable
Instruments Law, supporting both views.
124
2 DANIEL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 7th ed.,
1308 (New York, 1933); cf. BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW ANNOTATED,
6th ed., 944 (Cincinnati, 1938), to the effect that cases cited by him seem to indicate
that the last clause of section l IO has modified the common law of Kentucky, Maine,
Missouri, and Washington; Murphy, 18 Ohio Op. 460 (1940); Federal Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia v. Levy, (C.C.A. 3d, 1938) 97 F. (2d) 50; 4 UNiv. PITT. L. REv.
315 (1938); Murray v. Nelson, 145 Tenn. 459, 239 S.W. 764 (1922), 21 A.L.R.
1392 and note (1922).
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the others and includes such terms as may be consistent with the nature
of the act.

3. French System ( Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, Haiti, Paraguay,
Dominican Republic, and Uruguay)
This system is characterized by, among other things, the absence
of rules of positive law regulating the admissibility and effects of the
clause under consideration. Nevertheless, if the same be inserted by
the drawer in the body of the instrument, the courts admit that such
original stipulation, although not reproduced in the endorsements,
affects the successive endorsers.125 To the same effect, Lyon-Caen 126
declares that the clauses that appear in a bill are implied in the endorsements, that they are inherent in the instrument, but that, nevertheless,
commercial usage is not completely in accord, for which reason it is
prudent to repeat the clause in each endorsement.
The Union Syndicale des Banquiers des Departements 121 is of the
opinion that, in accordance with constant commercial usage, the clause
retour sans frais, written on the face (recto) of a bill has no effect except
wheri the bill has been drawn by the drawer to the order of a third
party, and that it is ineffective if the bill, drawn to the order of the
drawer himself, is endorsed by him to a third party without repeating
the stipulation.
The Chilean writer, Davis,128 considers that, if one of the endorsers
should refuse to accept the clause inserted by the drawer, and so speci125
Bouteron, "La clause de retour sans frais dans les e.ffets de commerce," l 929
AN. D. CoM. FR. 229 at 232.
The Belgian law of May 20, 1872, article 59, expressly provides this scope for
the clause. 1 FREDERICQ, PRINCIPES DE DROIT COMMERCIAL BELGE 465, § 483; 344
at 351 (text of the law) (Gantes, 1928); for this reason this system is generally
known as the Belgian system. 2 BLANco, EsTUmos ELEMENTALES DE DERECHO
MERCANTIL, 3d ed., 271 (Madrid, 1911); REBoRA, LETRAS DE CAMBIO, 3d ed., 276,
§ 305 (Paris, 1928).
In America, see 3 ARGANA, TRATADO DE DERECHO MERCANTIL 98 (Ascunci6n,
1936); REBORA, id. 378, § 307; 2 0BARRIO, CuRso DE DERECHO COMMERCIAL, 2d
ed., 394 (Buenos Aires, 1924); l DAv1s, LA LETRA DE CAMBIO 191 (Santiago de
Chile, 1928). See the decision in Chile in note 83, supra.
126
4 LYoN-CAEN ET RENAULT, TRAITE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL, 6th" ed., 100,
§ 102 and note 2, and 353, § 378 (Paris, 1923).
127
Cited by Bouteron, supra note 125, 1929 AN. D. CoM. FR. 229 at 233;
1832 SIREY, JURISPRUDENCE DE LA COUR DE CASSATION 46. 6 RUBEN DE Counmi,
D1CTIONNAIRE DE DROIT' COMMERCIAL, INDUSTRIAL, ET MARITIME, 3d ed., 92, § 97
(Paris, 1880); I PARDESsus, CouRs DE DROIT COMMERCIAL 425, cited by 4 LYoNCAEN ET RENAULT, TRA1TE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL, 6th ed., 352, § 378 (Paris,
1923).
128
I DAVIS, LA LETRA DE CAMBIA 190, § 117 (Santiago de Chile, 1928).
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:fied on the bill, a holder who sought to.preserve his rights against such
endorser and those following, would :find himself obliged to protest.
the bill.
If the clause is inserted by an endorser, there are some writers 129
who consider it equivalent to a special: engagement that applies to such
endorser vis-a-vis the future holder, and cannot be effective except
in relation to himself, the situation of each endorser being independent
and not subject to modification by the terms of a prior endorsement
to which he is not a party. As early as 1913, the Union Syndicale des
Banquiers des Departements 130 stated that one who endorses a bill
without reproducing the clause retour sans frais assumes the entire
responsibility for this lack of repetition.
Despite these opinions, what generally characterizes this system is
th_e fact that a clause inserted by an endorser binds subsequent endorsers. Naturally, it does not affect the drawer or prior endorsers. This
conception, which is maintained by the majority of the writers and
the courts,131 is defended by Lyon-Caen and Renault,182 who· hold
· that there is no reason why the transferor should not be able to modify
the position of his transferees. It has been followed by some American
writers 138 and by the Chilean legislation.184 Within its orbit are included the American legislations which in this subject matter follow
the French system, such as Argentina, Bolivia, Haiti, P?,raguay, the
129
·Bouteron, supra nQte 125, 1929 AN. D. CoM. FR. 229 at 233; 1832 SIREY,
JURISPRUDENCE DE LA COUR DE CASSATION 46. 6 RUBEN DE CoUDER 92, § 97; I
PARDESSUs 425 cited by 4 LYoN-CAEN AND RENAULT 352, § 378.
18
Cf. Bouteron, supra note 125, 1929 AN. D. CoM. FR. 229 at 236.
181
4 LYoN-CAEN ET RENAULT, TRAITE DE DROIT COM~ERCIAL, 6th ed., 352,
§ 378 (Paris, 1923), citing 4 ALAUZET, CoMMENTARIE DU CoDE DE CoMMEROE ET
DE LA LEGISLATION COMMERCIALE 1457 (1868); I NoUGIER, DES LETTRES DE
CHANGE ET DES EFFETS DE COMMERCE 258; THALLER, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE
DROIT COMMERCIAL, 3d ed., 1541 (1925); 20 DALLoZ, REPERTOIRE DE LEGISLATION,
DE DOCTRINE, ET DE JURISPRUDENCE 300, § 649 (Paris, 1850); 7 DALLOZ, REPERTOIRE PRATIQUE DE LEGISLATION, DE DOCTRINE, ET DE JURISPRUDENCE 637, § 334
(Paris, 1915).
182
4 LYoN-CAEN ET RENAULT, TRAITE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL, 6th ed., 352,
§ 378 (Paris, 1923).
188
3 ARGANA, TRATADO DE DERECHO MERCANTIL 98 (Asuncion, 1936); REBORA,
LETRAs DE CAMBio, 3d ed., 378, § 307 (Paris, 1928); I DAv1s, LA LETRA DE CAMBIO
190 (Santiago de Chile, 1928).
134 "El endosante y endosatario pueden celebrar convenios que modifiquen los
efectos juridicos del endoso.
"Aunque tales convenios se hallen consignados en el endoso, s6lo seran obligatorios
para las partes y los que adquieran posteriormente la propiedad de la letra." Chile-C. Com., art. 665.
·
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Dominican Republic, and Uruguay.135 This was the system approved
by the International Congress of Antwerp in 188 5, contrary to the
anteprojet of Norsa.136

4. Former Italian System (MtJxico)
One method of resolving the debated problem of the scope of a
waiver clause inserted by an endorser is to be found in the abrogated
Italian Code of Commerce of 1865, which in turn followed the Albertine Code.137 It is simply to prohibit the insertion by an endorser of
this clause, which is deemed in such case as not written. This solution .
has been adopted by Mexico,138 which admits only the clause inserted
by the drawer and considers as not writteµ that introduced by an endorser or by the holder. The same solution was adopted by the Brussels International Congress of 1888 139 but was rejected at The Hague
in 1912.140
In the Draft Regulation presented by the Committee of Legal
Experts at the Geneva Conference, the experts adopted the view that
an endorser should not be allowed to insert the clause, since, if permitted, there might exist the uncertainty whether such stipulation
were applicable to the subsequent endorsers. Therefore, they ,proposed
that when such clause was inserted by an endorser, it should be held
185

See pp. II 6- II 9, supra.
Congres International de Droit Commercial, Anvers, 1885, Projet, art. 37,
Actes 43 5; see introduction, id. 348 and note 3.
187
It.-C. Com., 1865, art. 261; Albertine Code, 1842, art. 189, cited by
SUPINO EDE SEMO, DELLA CAMBIALE E DELL'ASSEGNO BANCARIO 353 (Torino, 1935).
It is to be noted that the analogy between the Albertine Code and the Code of
1865, and those mentioned in the text, refers only to the solution with regard to a
clause inserted by an endorser. On the other hand, the former provided that where
it was inserted by the drawer, the instrument lost its character as a bill of exchange
and was transformed into a promissory note or order of payment, with the same
effects as a simple obligation. Ibid.; MALAGARRIGA, LA UNIFICACION INTERNACIONAL
DE LA LETRA DE CAMBIO 222 (Buenos Aires, 1916).
188
"El girador puede dispensar al tenedor de protestar la letra, inscribiendo
en ella la clausula 'sin protesto,' 'sin gastos' u otra equivalente • • •
"La clausula inscrita por el tenedor o por un endosante se tiene por no puesta."
Mex.-L. Gen. Tft. Op. Cr., art. '141.
139
Congres International de Droit Commercial, Bruxelles, 1888, Actes 554,
Projet art. 40; this proposal of M. Vauthier (Belgium) was approved by a vote of
18 to 15, Actes 516.
'
140
Beichmann (Norway) proposed that insertion by an endorser should not be
permitted and the complications thus avoided. The proposal was rejected. Deuxieme
Conference de La Haye pour !'unification du droit en matiere de lettre de change,
de billet a ordre, et de cheque, 191 2, 2 Actes 5 5.
186
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not written,141 a solution which was accepted by the International
Chamber of Commerce.142 The Convention, however, did not adopt
this, rule. 143
5-. Italian System of z882 (Brazil, El Salvador, and Peru)

Apart from certain conceptions by which it is sought to give some
validity to this clause under the Italian law,144 it may be stated that the
problem does not exist within the Italian system of 1882, since the
clause is considered as not written.145
-

6. System of the Hague Conferences (Ecuador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Venezuela)

It becomes most interesting to ascertain the true scope of the rule
agreed to at the two Conferences held at The Hague in 19 IO and
1912, since the provisions of the Uniform Regulation approved in
1912 have been the source of the enactments of Ecuador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.146 The text of the Uniform
Regulation is not clear on this question, and its mere reading seems to
suggest an omission.147 Xhis has caused the Venezuelan writer, Morales,148 to hold that the Hague Regulation did not solve the problem
of the scope of the clause in the case of its insertion by an endorser,
adding that this point is no clearer locally (referring to the Venezuelans), although he believes that what he calls the Belgian conception
141 L. OF N. No. C.234.M.83.1929.II, International Conference for the Unification of the Laws on Bills of Exchange, Promissory Notes, and Cheques, Preparatory
Documents 16, art. 45.
142 Report of M. Albert Troullier, id. Ip.
143
Supra, pp. 144-146, The Geneva Convention.
144 Supra, pp. 12 5-1 29, Italian System.
145
It.-C. Com., art. 309; cf. 3 V1vANTE, TRATADO DE DERECHO MERCANTIL
427, No. 1318 (Madrid, 1936); Bra.-Dec. 2044, art. 44, II; Peru-C. Com., art.
497; El Sal.-C. Com., art. 448.
146 Ec.-L. de 5.XII.1925, art. 45; Guat.-C. Com., art. 710; Hon.-C. Com.,
art. 596; Nic.-C. Com., art. 644; Ven.-C. Com., art. 434.
147 "Le tireur ou un endosseur peut, par la clause de 'retour sans frais,' 'sans
protet,' ou toute autre clause equivalent, dispenser le porteur de faire dresser, pour
exercer ses recours, un protet faute d'acceptation ou faute de paiement.
"Cette clause no dispense le porteur ni de la presentation de la lettre de change
dans les delais prescrits ni des avis a donner a un endosseur precedent et au tireur. La
preuve de l'inobservation des delais incombe a celui qui s'en prevaut contre le porteur.
"La clause emanant du tireur produit ses effets a l'egard de'tous les signataires.
Si malgre cette clause, le porteur fait dresser le protet, les frais en restent a sa charge.
Quand la clause emane d'un endosseur, les frais du protet, s'il en est dresse un, peuvent
etre recouvres contre tous les signataires." Hague---R.U., art. 45.
148 MoRALEs, EsTUDIO SOBRE LA LETRA DE CAMBIO EN EL C6DIGO DE CoMERCIO
VENEZOLANO 103 (Caracas, 1935).
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( which has been termed above the French system) is the prevailing
one, in view of the fact that the assignor or endorser can modify the
condition of its assignees or endorsees.
In the report presented to the Conference (The Hague, 19rn) on
behalf of the Central Committee, by Lyon-Caen and Simons,149 it was
remarked that the Committee agreed that, if the clause was inserted by
the drawer, it bound all who signed, but, if it was inserted by an endorser, it would have effect only as to him.150 The resolution of the
Committee met with no objection in the plenary session,151 being approved in its original wording; nevertheless, for reasons which do not
appear in the Actes, in drafting the anteprojet, the last paragraph of
the motion ,in question was modified, the specific reference to the personal limitation of a clause inserted by an endorser being omitted.152
At the .Hague Conference in I 9 I 2, which took as its basis the anteprojet of 19rn, no objection whatsoever was made in the discussion of
the text in question.153 At the meeting of the Committee of Revision,
the only innovation, proposed by the Japanese delegate, Seitaro Tomitani, was to abandon the Hague system of I 9 Io and to introduce the
restrictive German system, but this was not approved.154 In the report
presented to the Conference on behalf of the Committee of Revision,
concerning the modifications of the anteprojet of a Uniform Law of
I 9 io, presented by Lyon-Caen and Simons, the position of the Central
Committee of the Hague Conference of 1910 was specifically and emphatically ratified.155 Nevertheless, in the text of the draft Uniform
Regulation presented by the Committee of Revision, the same omission
Conference de La Haye pour l'unification du droit re4tif a la lettre de change,
a ordre et de cheque, 1910, Actes 7 5 at 94.
1
:rn "La clause de retour san frais inseree par le tireur clans la lettre de change,
produit ses effets a l'egard de tous les signataires, nonobstant toute stipulation contraire
clans les endossements.
"Cette clause, quand elle est inseree clans un endossement, ne produit d'effets
qu'a l'egard de l'endosseur qui l'y a inscrite. Dans ce cas, les frais du protet, s'il a ete
dresse, peuvent etre recouvres contre tous les signataires." Resolutions du Comite, annex
to the Report, art. 73. Id. 98 at I I 2.
151
Sixth plenary session, id. 67-74.
152
" • • • Quand cette clause est insere clans un endossement, les frais du protet,
s'il a ete dresse, peuvent etre recouvres contre tous les signataires." Avant-projet, art.
53. Id. I 56.
153
Deuxieme Conference de La Haye pour !'unification du droit en matiere de
lettre de change, de billet a ordre, et de cheque, 1912, I Actes 33, Third plenary
session.
154
2 id. 5 5; cf. project presented by Japan at 3 20.
155 "II est important de constater (I) que la clause de retour sans frais emanant
du tireur pro~uit ses effets a l'egard de tous les signataires; (2) qu'au contraire, la
149
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was repeated,1 56 which was reproduced in the text of the Uniform
Regulation approved in the seventh plenary session,m and naturally
is to be found in the American legislations that have followed this
regulation.
Another interesting omission, which refers to a question that has
already been mentioned,158 relates to the possibility that an endorser of
a bill that contains the clause "without costs" inserted by the drawer,
may, by means of an express provision in the bill, require performance
of the formality of protest (naturally only with regard to himself).
The Resolutions of the Central Committee and the Hague anteprojet
of r 9 IO 159 concretely provided that a clause inserted in a bill. of exchange by the drawer, should be effective against all signatory parties,
notwithstanding any contrary stipulation in the endorsements.
This point was not mentioned in the plenary session at The Hague
in r9r2, at which the anteprojet was discussed, 160 nor by the Committee of Revision,161 nor in its report.162 Nevertheless, for reasons that
also are not to be found in the Actes, the phrase "notwithstanding any
other stipulation to the contrary in the endorsements" was omitted
in the draft of the Central Committee and in the Regulation as approved.163 As in the previous case, the omission recurs in the American texts above cited.
(a) The Geneva Convention. In ·spite of the report and the draft
submitted by the Committee of Experts,164 which declared a clause
inserted by an endorser to be not written, the Geneva Convention accepted the Hague system, which was -defended against the experts by
Quassowski (Germany),105 holding that in this system the effect of
the clause was clear.
meme clause emanant d'un endosseur n'a d'effets qu'a l'egard de celui-ci." 1 id. 75 at
94.
156 Id. I 14, art. 45.
157 " ... La clause emanant du tireur produit ses effets a l'egard de tous les
signataires. Si malgre cette clause le porteur fait dresser le protet, les frais en restent
a sa charge. Quand la clause emane d'un endosseur, les frais du protet, s'il en est
dresse un, peuvent etre recouvres contre tous les signataires." La Haye-R.U., art.
45, par. 3; id. 251.
158
See DAvrs, supra note 125, and MACKENZIE, supra note 100.
159 Resolutions, art. 73, supra note 150; Avant-projet, art. 53.
160 Deuxieme Conference de .La Haye pour }'unification du droit en matiere de
lettre de change, de billet a ordre, et de cheque, 1912, I Actes. 33.
161 2 id. 54-56.
162 I id. 75 at 94·
168
Projet, art. 45; La Haye-R.U., art. 45; see note I 56, supra.
164 See notes 140 and 141, supra.
165
L. OF N. No. C.234.M.83.1929.II, International Conference for the Unification of the Laws on Bills of Exchange, Promissory Notes, and Cheques, Records 296.

1945

J

wAIVER

OF PROTEST

1 45

This time it, was expressly declared that, if the stipulation was
written in by the drawer, it would be effective for all persons who had
signed the bill; if inscribed by an endorser or an avaliste,166 it could
be effective only with regard to such endorser or avaliste, in accord
with the previously established principle of autonomy of endorsements,
as pointed out in the report of the Drafting Committee.167
If the clause is inserted by the drawer, it remains to determine
whom it affects, pursuant to the expression, "all parties who have
signed the bill." This becomes important, not only in the exercise of
the action of recourse, but also in actions to recover damages on accounts of protests unduly made. According to Supino and de Semo,168
it includes not only the avalistes, but also referees in case of need and
even the acceptor. The language of the law is wider.than .if it were
stated, "all those liable to recourse." At the Conference, precisely in
connection with the question of damages, Bouteron (France) 169 indicated that the expression seemed to include the acceptor, and that
acceptance on the part of the drawee of a bill which contained the
clause "without costs" inserted by the drawer, would thus be equivalent to a conditional acceptance, as a consequence of which it would
be better not to include the acceptor among "all parties who have
signed the bill." Nevertheless, the text as it had been proposed by the
Italian delegation was approved.110
With regard to a clause inserted by an endorser or avaliste, the
principle is to limit it solely and exclusively to the party who inserted
it. It has been held 111 that, contrary to the principle of formal dependence ( accessoriedad formal), the insertion of the clause by an endorser
does not obviate the necessity of protest in order to sue one who has
given aval for him o~ who has accepted the bill supra protest in his
166

"If the stipulation is written by the drawer, it is operative in respect of all
persons who have signed the bill; if it is written by an endorser or an tKJdiseur, it is
operative only in respect of such endorser or avaliseur ••• " Gen.-L.U., art. 46,
par. 3.
167
L. OF N. No. C.360.M.151.1930.II, International Conference for the Unifi.cation of the Laws on Bills of Exchange, Promissory Notes, and Cheques, Records
142, § 1 I I ; cf. BRAcco, LA LEGGE UNIFORME SULLA CAMBIALE 67, § 34 (Padova,
1935); SUPINO E DE SEMO, DELLA CAMBIALE E DELL'ASSEGNO BANCARIO 356, § 386
(Torino, 1935).
168
Id. 355, § 386.
169
L. OF N. No. C.360.M.151.1930.II, International Conference for the Unification of the Laws on Bills of Exchange, Promissory Notes, and Cheques, Records 297.
110 Id. 298.
171
STAUB, STRANZ, AND LEscoT, cited by 2 VALERI, D1R1TT0 cAMBIAR10 ITALIANO
380, § 273, note 4 (Milano, 1938).
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honor. On the contrary, Valeri 172 holds that the principle established
by article 37 of the Italian law (article 32 of the Uniform Law) with
regard to aval, and by article 77 of the Italian law (article 58 of the
Uniform Law) with regard to intervention, should be interpreted in
harmony.with the general rule of article 53 of the Italian law (article
46 of the Uniform Law), and that, on the other hand, the formulation of this general rule established in the law, does not seem irreconcilable with the assimilation, even in this field, of the legal position of
the avalist~ or of the intervener with that of the person for whom the
aval is given or for whose honor the bill is accepted.

7. The Special Case of Cuba
As has been indicated,173 in Cuba 174 the very admissibility of the
waiver clause is a highly debatable problem. If the view that insertion
of the clause transforms the bill into a mere promissory: note is accepted, it would follow that, if the bill should originate in commercial
transactions, it would be a mercantile promissory note; this would
raise the problem, beyond the limits of this work, of determining the
scope of the requirement of protest and even of waiver of protest in
commercial promissory notes l
Among the authors who accept the -admissibility of the clause without incurring such transformation of the bill, Gay de Montella 175
appears to ascribe to it the same effects as the Geneva Convention.
Pifiol Agull6 176 seems inclined toward the French system, although he
1121d. 380, § 273.
173
See pp. IIC)-125, supra, Spanish System.
174
Cuba-C. Com., art. 532.
175
"El tenedor [? ?librador] de la cambial puede entregarla con la indicaci6n
inserta en la misma de que se presente a la aceptaci4in o la cobro sin gastos, en cuyo
caso el cedente protesta de los que se hagan por causa de protesto, corriendo por tanto
a cargo del cesionario si se efectuan. Pero si no fuera el librador quien insertara la
indicaci6n sino que la consignara un endosatario posterio.r, caso de no protestarse la
letra, incurrira esta en la tacha de perj udicada, siendo responsable de la falta de protesto, el endosatario que la hubiere insertado en la letra, perdiendo su acci6n contra las
anteriores cedentes. Deber de los endosatarios posteriores a esta indicaci6n no puesta
por el librado, es de protestarla a pesar de la indicaci6n, si no quieren correr las
consecuencias de tal clausula .•. " GAY DE MoNTELLA, C6mco DE CoMERCIO ESPANOL,
tomo 3, vol. 2, 595-596 (Barcelona, 1936).
176
"Si fue el librador quien puso la, indicaci6n de sin gastos .•• tanto el librador
como los sucesivos cedentes protestan de los gastos que puedan ocasionar el protesto y
si este se hiciese reintegrarfan en su caso unicamente el importe de la cambial, es decir,
es potestativo 'del tenedor el protestarla o no, pero las gastos corren de su cuenta.
"Mas si fuera un posterior cedente el que indicara esta clausula y la letra no se
protestare, se entendera perjudicada para el que hubiera puesto la condici6n o
indicaci6n, ya que fue el culpable de la falta de protesto y asf como los sucesivos cedentes
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falls into an inconsistency that rather places him close to the English
system, but of these, neither is clear. Blanco,177 though in a very succinct manner, accepts the solution voted by the Congress of Antwerp,
namely, the French system.
, The Spanish writer, Pedro Huguet,178 conceives that, if the clause
has been inserted by the drawer, the bill has the character of a promissory note to order for all those who have participated in its creation
and circulation, from the drawer to the last holder and the drawee,
inclusively; but, if it has been inserted by one of the endorsers, the
bill retains its character as a perfect bill of exchange ( cambial) for all
persons who have taken part in its creation and circulation, except for
such endorser in relation to the endorsees who have acquired the document after the inclusion of the clause in question. In the first case, if
the drawee refuses to accept or to pay the bill, the holder does not
have to protest it but should proceed as if he had a promissory note to
order. In the case of insertion by an endorser, he holds that, on the
contrary, it must be protested, since in such case it is necessary for the
holder to prove that he made presentment in due time, in order that
those who may be in position to do so may assert the liabilities accruing
for failure of acceptance or payment against the person by whom they
may have been incurred through fault or negligence. In such event,
the holder may prosecute the action available on a perfect bill of exchange (cambial), against any of the persons liable who did not sign
after said clause, but with respect to parties thereto it is possible only
for him to turn the bill over to them in order that they may refund
its amount and repay the costs of the protest.
Huguet holds that such costs are to be repaid because, even if an
endorsement be made with the condition "without costs" or "without
protest," nevertheless the holder, by making protest, acted as implied
agent (gestor de negocios) for the endorser, preyenting the bill from
podran pedirse por el orden natural el resarcimiento del importe de la cambial, aquel
solo podra actutar segun disponen los articulos 469, 482 y 483, perdiendo su acci6n
contra los anteriores cedentes. S. de T.S. de 18 noviembre 1927.
"Pero tengase muy en cuenta por los cesionarios, que deben de abstenerse de
hacer modificaciones en las cambiales, es decir, poner esta indicaci6n si no la puso el
librador y si el la indic6, pero por la ilaci6n de los endosos dej6 de figurar esta indicaci6n, el tenedor debe de necesariamente protestarla aunque figurarara en el anverso
de la letra.'' P1NOL AouLL6, CoMENTARIOS AL C6DIGO MERCANTIL J<;SPA.NOL,
sEcc16N LETRA DE cAMBIO 369-370 (Madrid, 1933).
177
"El efecto que a lo sumo podia darsele era dispensar al portador del protesto,
como se acord6 en el Congreso de Amberes." 2 BLANCO, EsTUDIOS ELEMENTALES DE
DERECHO MERCANTIL, 3d ed., 272 (Madrid, 1911).
178
HUGUET, LA LETRA DE CAMBio, 2d ed., 264 (Barcelona, 1910).
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becoming prejudiced (perjudicada) and returning it in such condition
that such endorser can exercise the right of re-exchange or the executory action with all its legal consequences, against the other parties
liabJe.
·
8. Summary
Analyzing and summarizing the rules enacted by the American
countries, it may be noted that Canada and Costa Rica 179 follow the
restrictive English principle. The United States, Panama, and Colombia 180 follow a more liberal principle, although the majority opinion
tends to impose limitations corresponding to the Hague and Geneva
Conventions. Argentina, Bolivia, Haiti, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, and Uruguay,181 as has been seen, follow the French system,
characterized by liberality. By express enactment, Chile 182 in this matter follows the French system. Mexico 188 excises the debated part of
the question, returning to the former Italian system, which admits the
clause inserted by the drawer only. Brazil, Peru, and El Salvador 184
almost eliminate the problem by following the negative system of the
Italian law of r882. Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and
Panama 185 follow the Hague Uniform Regulation. Cuba 186 presents a
problem sui generis, with the possibility of following the system of the
Geneva Convention.
Among the American draft proposals, it is noted that the Proyecto
Cueto. 187 in no way.modifies the position of Cuba; the Proyecto Yadarola 188 (Argentina) accepts the principle of the Geneva Convention.
We must make clear that we have referred only to the scope of the
negotiatory waiver clause (clausula cambial), i.e., of the clause appearing inserted in -a bill.
179

Can.-B.E.A., s. 34(b); C.R.-Ley de Cambio, art. 18.
U.S.-N.I.L., s. 110; Pan.-Ley 52 de 1917, art. 110; Col.-Ley 46 de
•
1923, art. I I 2.
181
See pp. 139-14 I, supra, French System.
182
Chile--C. Com., art. 665.
188 Mex.-L. Gen. Tit. Op. Cr., -art. 141.
18 <l Bra.-Dec. 2044, art. 44, II; Peru-C. Com., art. 497; El Sal.-C. Com.,
art. 448.
.
185 Ec.-L. 5.XII.1925, art. 45; Guat.-C. Com. art. 710; Hon.-C. Com.,
art. 596; Nic.-C. Com., art. 644; Ven.-C. Com., art 434.
186 See pp. 146-148, supra, The' Special Case of Cuba.
187 Cuba- Comisi6n Nacional Codificadora, I BoLETIN DE LEGISLACION 130 ff.
(La Habana, 1929) .
188 Arg.-Yadarola project, art. 50. lNSTITUTO ARGENTINO DE ESTUDIOS LEGISLATivos, EL DERECHO CAMBIARIO ARGENTINO Y LA LEGISLACION UNIFORME, Publicaci6n
No. 6, 30 and 123· (Buenos Aires, 1940).
180

